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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
  The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”),1 an amendment to the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) of 1938, added to § 6 of the FLSA 
“the principle of equal pay for equal work regardless of sex.”2  The 
EPA was the first modern employment discrimination statute, and it 
addresses a very specific form of gender discrimination in 
employment—unequal pay for equal work.3  Less than one year later, 
Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which also 
prohibits sex-based wage discrimination.4  Title VII is broader than 
the EPA because it also prohibits many other forms of discriminatory 
employment practices based on other protected traits including an 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.5  Although 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; Litigation and Alternative Dispute Resolution Certificate. 
1 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000). 
2 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 190 (1974). 
3 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 366 (3d ed. 2004). 
4 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
5 Section 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).  Section 703(a)(1) states 
that it is an “unlawful employment practice” for a covered employer “to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation terms, conditions or privileges of 
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both statutes protect an employee from sex-based wage discrimination 
in employment, the statutes function differently.6
Section 206(d)(1) of the EPA establishes that  
 
[n]o employer having employees subject to any provisions of 
this section shall discriminate, between employees on the basis 
of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at 
the rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees 
of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on 
jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working 
conditions.7
 
The EPA has four exceptions for discriminatory pay between the sexes 
where an employer has in place “(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit 
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality 
of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other 
than sex.”8  Thus, the EPA is divided into two parts—part one is 
prohibitory, while the second part lays out the affirmative defenses.9  
The affirmative defenses, in effect, “authorize” employers to 
differentiate in pay if the reason for that differentiation falls within one 
of the four categories, even though that differentiation might otherwise 
violate the Act.10   
 The circuit courts are split in their interpretation of the “factor 
other than sex” defense.11  Employers frequently assert that a 
difference in wages between employees of opposite sexes is the result 
of basing their initial salary on the prior salary an employee was 
                                                                                                                   
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.” 
6 See County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981). 
7 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000). 
8 Id. 
9 Gunther, 452 U.S. at 169. 
10 Id. 
11 See infra notes 13-14. 
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earning elsewhere.  They argue that the use of prior salary in setting 
wages qualifies as a “factor other than sex,” and therefore is not a 
violation of the EPA.12  The Seventh Circuit, along with the Eighth 
Circuit, finds that any gender-neutral reason asserted by the employer 
qualifies as a factor other than sex.13  On the other hand, several 
circuits, including the Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, use a 
legitimate business reason test when examining an employer’s “factor 
other than sex.”14   
 This article will show that the Seventh Circuit incorrectly 
analyzed an EPA claim in Wernsing v. Department of Human 
Services.15  In this decision, the court also rejected the legitimate 
business reason test from the Ninth Circuit based on the Seventh 
Circuit’s incorrect analysis of an EPA claim.16
 Part of the problem interpreting the factor other than sex 
defense stems from the interaction of the EPA with Title VII.  The 
Seventh Circuit treated the EPA claim in Wernsing as if it were the 
same as a Title VII claim.17  In doing so, the Seventh Circuit has made 
EPA litigation defendant-friendly, creating an enormous difficulty for 
a plaintiff seeking to prove a violation of the EPA, and has thus eroded 
the intent and purpose of the statute.  
 
II.  THE FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX DEFENSE OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT  
AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EQUAL PAY ACT AND TITLE VII 
 
 The Supreme Court has only decided one case brought under an 
Equal Pay Act claim.18  Although the Supreme Court’s decision 
                                                 
12 See infra notes 13-14. 
13 Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005);  Strecker 
v. Grand Forks County Soc. Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1980). 
14 Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992); Kouba v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982); Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841 
F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988).  
15 Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 466. 
16 Id.  
17 See infra note 125. 
18 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
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provides some guidance for interpreting the Act’s factor other than sex 
defense, the Supreme Court did not articulate a standard for 
determining what qualifies as a factor other than sex.19  In addition, 
the Court has also examined the Act in claims brought under Title 
VII.20  An examination of  the differences between EPA and Title VII 
litigation, combined with the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the 
EPA, and the Act’s purposes and legislative history, is an integral 
inquiry in order to formulate a standard for determining what qualifies 
as a factor other than sex. 
 
A.  Supreme Court decisions addressing the EPA’s Factor Other than 
Sex Defense. 
 
 The landmark case of Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,  has 
been the only instance where the Supreme Court has decided a case 
that was brought under the EPA.21  Corning Glass involved a wage 
disparity between male night shift inspectors and female day 
inspectors.22  The wage disparity had somewhat of a historical basis – 
Corning initially instituted a night shift between 1925 and 1930 when 
New York and Pennsylvania law prohibited women from working at 
night.23  Therefore, the company needed to fill the night shift inspector 
position, traditionally a female position, with male day workers.24  
These men demanded and received higher wages than those paid to the 
female day inspectors.25  At this time, the only pay disparity between 
                                                 
19  Id.   
20 County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); City of L.A. Dep’t of 
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).  Both of these cases were brought 
under Title VII’s Bennett Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000).    
21 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
22 Id. at 190. 
23 Id. at 191. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
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the night shift and day shift positions existed with respect to the 
position of inspector.26
 After the laws of New York and Pennsylvania were amended 
to allow women to work at night, women at Corning were allowed to 
bid on the higher paid night inspection jobs.27  In 1969, a new 
collective bargaining agreement eliminated the wage disparity 
between day and night inspectors hired after the date of the agreement, 
but provided a “red circle” rate for current inspectors, thus allowing 
for a continued disparity between day and night inspectors.28
 Corning argued that day shift work and night shift work were 
not performed under “similar working conditions” as required by the 
EPA.29  The Secretary of Labor contended that such a shift differential 
would fall under the “factor other than sex” exception, and that 
Corning had failed to prove that paying higher wages to its male night 
inspectors was based on any factor other than sex.30  The Court looked 
to the statute’s language, history, and Congressional intent, and 
determined that the work at issue was “equal work” as defined by the 
EPA.31   
The Court found that Corning failed to prove that its 
compensation system for the inspector position was not based upon 
sex.32  Although the EPA allows for wage differentials based on 
nondiscriminatory shift differentials, in Corning the pay disparity 
arose simply because the men originally thought the inspector work 
performed by women demeaning.  In order to perform this work 
during a night shift, they demanded higher pay, but all other positions 
were paid the same whether performed during the night or day shift.33  
Therefore, the Court concluded, the pay disparity “reflected a job 
                                                 
26 Id. at 191-92. 
27 Id. at 192-93. 
28 Id. at 194. 
29 Id. at 197. 
30 Id. at 197-202. 
31 Id. at 203. 
32 Id. at 204-05. 
33 Id. at 205. 
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market in which Corning could pay women less than men for the same 
work.”34
 
B.  Supreme Court decision regarding the relationship between the 
Equal Protection Act and Title VII. 
 
The Supreme Court has also had occasion to examine the EPA 
in cases brought under Title VII.  County of Washington v. Gunther 
involved the relationship between Title VII and the EPA.35   The 
Bennett Amendment, contained in section 703(h) of Title VII, 
provides that  
 
[i]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice under [Title 
VII] for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in 
determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or 
to be paid to employees of such employer if such 
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of [the Equal 
Pay Act].36  
 
The Supreme Court examined the affect of the Bennett Amendment on 
Title VII wage-based discrimination claims in County of Washington 
v. Gunther.37
In County of Washington, female guards in a county jail filed a 
wage discrimination claim under Title VII, alleging that the County of 
Washington intentionally discriminated against them by paying the 
female guards in the female section of the jail less than the wages paid 
to the male guards in the male section of the jail.38  The county 
defended the suit by claiming that the Bennett Amendment restricted 
sex-based wage discrimination claims under Title VII to those that 
                                                 
34 Id.  
35 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2005). 
37 County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
38 Id. at 163-64. 
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could also be brought under the Equal Pay Act.39  Because the Equal 
Pay Act only permits claims for “equal work,” the county argued that 
the Bennett Amendment precluded suit because the jobs of the male 
and female guards were not “equal.”40
The plaintiffs argued that the Bennett Amendment was 
designed only to incorporate the four affirmative defenses of the EPA 
into Title VII for sex-based wage discrimination claims, and  therefore 
did not restrict Title VII claims to the “equal or substantially equal 
work” standard of the EPA.41  The Supreme Court agreed with the 
plaintiff’s argument, finding that the Bennett Amendment to Title VII 
incorporated the affirmative defenses of the EPA into an unequal pay 
claim under Title VII.42  Additionally, the Court noted that it was not 
deciding how discrimination litigation under Title VII should be 
structured to incorporate the EPA’s affirmative defense of “factor 
other than sex,” which requires an employer to prove that a wage 
differential is not based on sex, different from Title VII’s burden of 
proof shifting.43   
Although the Court did not articulate a standard for 
determining what qualifies as a factor other than sex in Gunther, the 
case does provide some guidance for determining how sex-based wage 
discrimination claims should be decided.  First, the Court noted that 
employers may defend against charges of sex-based wage 
discrimination under the EPA where pay differentials “are based on a 
bona fide use of ‘other factors other than sex.’”44  Also, the Court 
recognized that EPA and Title VII are structured differently, and 
function under different burdens of proof.45
 
C.  The Equal Pay Act and Title VII: Different Burdens of Proof. 
                                                 
39 Id. at 168. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 169-70. 
44 Id. at 170. (emphasis added).   
45 Id.  
135 
7
Linsted: The Seventh Circuit's Erosion of the Equal Pay Act
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                    Volume 1, Issue 1                    Spring 2006 
 
One year after the EPA was enacted, Congress passed Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), prohibiting, inter alia, 
gender discrimination in all “terms, conditions or privileges” of 
employment.46  Title VII also prohibits sex-based wage 
discrimination, but unlike the EPA’s narrow application to wage 
differentials attributable to sex discrimination, Title VII’s prohibitions 
were “intended to be broadly inclusive, proscribing ‘not only overt 
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but 
discriminatory in operation.’”47  The structure of Title VII litigation, 
with its shifting burdens of proof, varying defenses, and presumptions, 
was designed to reflect its broad nature.48  On the other hand, EPA 
litigation, specifically the fourth affirmative defense, has been 
structured differently than Title VII.49  EPA litigation is designed to 
allow employers to defend against charges of wage discrimination 
where pay differentials are based “on a bona fide use of ‘other factors 
other than sex.’”50
 
1.  EPA: Burden of Proof. 
   
In order to make out a prima facie case under the EPA, the 
plaintiff has a heavy burden of proof51 to establish that employees of 
the opposite sex receive different wages “for equal work on jobs the 
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, 
and which are performed under similar working conditions.”52  A 
female plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing “(1) higher 
wages were paid to a male employee, (2) for equal work requiring 
                                                 
46 Section 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2005).   
47 County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981) (quoting Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 439 (1971)). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). 
52 Id.  
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substantially similar skill, effort and responsibilities, and (3) the work 
was performed under similar working conditions.”53  Once a prima 
facie case is established, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to 
establish that the difference in pay is permitted under one of the four 
exceptions, or affirmative defenses, permitted by the EPA.54  
Therefore, under the EPA, the “risk of nonpersuasion rests with the 
employer on the ultimate issue of liability.”55
The EPA does not require a plaintiff to show intent to 
discriminate, and has been referred to as a “strict liability” statute for 
this reason.56  In contrast, under Title VII claims the burden of 
persuasion rests with the plaintiff at all times to show discriminatory 
intent.57
 
2.  Title VII: Burden of Proof. 
 
The standard for proof of discrimination under Title VII is 
different from the EPA because EPA litigation follows a two-step 
burden-shifting paradigm, whereas Title VII follows a three-step 
burden shifting framework.58 Under Title VII, individuals proving 
discrimination can proceed either through a theory of disparate 
treatment or disparate impact.59  The burden framework for both 
theories is divided into three steps.  This framework for a disparate 
treatment case was first announced in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. 
Green.60
                                                 
53 Stopka v. Alliance of Am. Insurers, 141 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir. 1998). 
54 Fallon v. State of Ill., 882 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Corning 
Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 195). 
55 Id. 
56 Ryduchowski v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 203 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 
2000); Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1213. 
57 Fallon, 882 F.2d at 1213.   
58 Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2000). 
59 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
60 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Alternatively, in 1971, the Court announced the 
disparate impact theory of liability for cases brought under Title VII in Griggs v. 
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Under a McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff proving a 
sex-based wage discrimination claim must first establish that a 
member of the opposite sex in a similar job position as plaintiff 
receives a higher level of pay.61  The burden then shifts to the 
defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the 
wage discrepancy.62  Once this minimal burden of articulation is met, 
the plaintiff then has the burden of proof to establish that the proffered 
reason was a pretext for discrimination.63  Under Title VII, the burden 
of proof remains with the plaintiff at all times.64  Once a plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the 
defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its action.65  If 
this occurs, the plaintiff must then prove that the proffered reason is 
merely a pretext for discrimination.66  Therefore, under a Title VII 
claim, the plaintiff always bears the risk of nonpersuasion.67
  
D.  The Legislative History and Purpose of the Equal Pay Act. 
 
 The statement of purpose of the EPA declares Congress’ 
findings that wage differentials based on sex “depress[] wages and 
living standards for employees necessary for their health and 
                                                                                                                   
Duke Power Co.  Unlike disparate treatment, the employer’s discriminatory intent in 
irrelevant under a disparate impact theory.  A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case 
of discrimination under a disparate impact theory by establishing that a neutral 
employment policy or practice had a significant discriminatory impact on a protected 
group.  Once this is established, the burden then shifts to the employer to show that 
the policy or practice was job-related or consistent with business necessity.   The 
plaintiff may still prevail at this point by showing that an alternative practice existed.  
401 U.S. 424 (1971).  Congress officially codified the disparate impact theory in its 
amendments to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
61 Texas Dep’t. of Cmty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 253; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
64 Fallon v. State of Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1989). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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efficiency.” 68  Congress furthered declared that the policy of the EPA 
was to correct these conditions.69
Congress enacted the EPA in 1963 in order to “remedy what 
was perceived to be a serious and endemic problem” in private 
employment industries – that many wages were scaled on “an ancient 
but outmoded belief that a man, because of his role in society, should 
be paid more than a woman even though his duties are the same.”70  In 
addition, the Supreme Court has noted that the EPA itself is “broadly 
remedial” and should be interpreted and applied in order to achieve its 
underlying purposes.71
The Supreme Court examined the legislative history behind the 
EPA in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan.72  The original version of 
the Equal Pay bill only allowed for two exceptions for wage 
differentials, those based on a seniority or merit increase system that 
did not discriminate on the basis of sex.73  Due to a concern that this 
version of the bill did not fully encompass job evaluation systems that 
established equitable wages in the industry, the amended version of 
the Act defined equal work in terms of “skill, effort, responsibility, 
and working conditions.”74  The Court found that Congress’ clear 
intent in incorporating this language was to “ensure that wage 
differentials based upon bona fide job evaluation plans would be 
outside the purview of the Act.”75  To support this intent, the Court 
quoted the House Report: 
 
This language [skill, effort, responsibility, and working 
conditions] recognizes that there are many factors which may 
be used to measure the relationships between jobs and which 
                                                 
68 Pub. L. No. 88-38, §2(a), 77 Stat. 56 (1963). 
69 Pub. L. No. 88-38, §2(b), 77 Stat. 56 (1963). 
70 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). 
71 Id. at 208. 
72 417 U.S. at 188. 
73 Id. at 198.  
74 Id. at 201. 
75 Id. at 201 (emphasis added). 
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establish a valid basis for a difference in pay.  These factors 
will be found in a majority of the job classification systems.  
Thus, it is anticipated that a bona fide job classification 
program that does not discriminate on the basis of sex will 
serve as a valid defense to a charge of discrimination.76
 
Although the Court in Corning used the legislative history to interpret 
the phrase “working conditions” as used in the EPA,77 Congress’s 
characterizations of job evaluation plans and classification systems as 
bona fide demonstrate its intent to only allow factors tied to legitimate 
business reasons to defend against charges of discrimination.   
 Of the four affirmative defenses, Congress intended the fourth 
one, “factor other than sex,” to be a “broad general exception.”78  It 
was designed in order to narrow the scope of the EPA to wage 
differentials based on sex discrimination.79  Therefore, employers may 
defend against discrimination litigation brought under the EPA where 
differentials in pay are based “on a bona fide use of ‘other factors 
other than sex.’”80
 
III.  VARYING INTERPRETATIONS BETWEEN THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
REGARDING PRIOR SALARY AS A FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX 
 
A.  Other Circuit Interpretations Regarding the Equal Pay Act’s Factor 
Other than Sex Defense. 
 
In County of Washington v. Gunther, the Court stated in dicta 
that the fourth affirmative defense of the EPA differs from Title VII 
litigation.  Title VII was intended to encompass both intentional 
discrimination as well as “practices that are fair in form, but 
                                                 
76 417 U.S. at 201 (quoting  H.R. REP. NO. 88-309 at 8 (1963)). 
77 Id. 
78 Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium, 769 F.2d 1251, 1261 (7th Cir. 1985). 
79 County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981). 
80 Id.  
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discriminatory in operation,”81 whereas the EPA’s “factor other than 
sex” defense was designed in order to narrow the scope of the EPA to 
wage differentials based on sex discrimination.82  However, the Court 
noted that it was not deciding how discrimination litigation under Title 
VII should be structured to incorporate the EPA’s affirmative defense 
of “factor other than sex” which requires an employer to show that a 
wage differential is not based on sex, different from Title VII’s burden 
of proof shifting. 
The Seventh Circuit inferred that this passage stated that the 
EPA was limited to disparate treatment claims, and did not have a 
disparate impact component.83  However, because the Supreme Court 
also noted in the same passage that EPA litigation is structured in 
order to permit employers to defend charges of discrimination by 
showing that a wage differential is based on bona fide uses of “other 
factors other than sex,”84 other circuits have interpreted this passage 
differently than the Seventh, requiring an “acceptable business 
reason”85 in conjunction with a “factor other than sex” defense. 
Circuits requiring an acceptable business to justify the EPA’s 
factor other than sex defense correctly analyze EPA claims.  As noted 
above, EPA and Title VII litigation functions differently, with 
different burdens of proof.  Disparate treatment and disparate impact 
analysis reflects Title VII analysis.  Requiring an acceptable business 
reason to justify a factor other than sex defense under an EPA claim 
properly requires an employer to prove an affirmative defense.   
In Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co.,86 a Title VII case dealing 
with the EPA’s “factor other than sex” defense incorporated into Title 
VII by the Bennett Amendment, the Ninth Circuit examined whether  
Allstate’s policy of setting wages based on an employee’s former 
salary constituted a “factor other than sex.”  The Ninth Circuit held 
                                                 
81 Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). 
82 Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170. 
83 Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 469 (7th Cir. 2005). 
84 Gunther, 452 U.S. at 169. 
85 Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982). 
86 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982). 
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that the EPA does not prohibit the use of prior salary as a “factor other 
than sex,” but any such use should be justified by an acceptable 
business reason.87  The court reasoned that because the EPA is 
concerned with business practices, any “factor other than sex” defense 
must still be tied to an acceptable business reason.88  Allowing wage 
differentials where an employer asserts a “factor other than sex” that is 
unrelated to business practices is thus “nonsensical” under the EPA.89  
The Second Circuit also requires the legitimate business reason 
test when examining a factor other than sex and has correctly 
distinguished EPA from Title VII litigation.  In Aldrich v. Randolph 
Central School District,90 the school district defended a claim of sex-
based wage discrimination under both the EPA and Title VII, claiming 
that its job classification system was a “factor other than sex” under 
the EPA.  The school district employed both “cleaners” and 
“custodians,” with custodians receiving higher pay.91  Under local 
civil service rules, custodian applicants were required to take a civil 
service exam.92  Aldrich, employed as a cleaner, claimed that she 
performed the same work as male custodians but was classified and 
paid as a cleaner in violation of the EPA. 
The court held that a gender neutral job classification system is 
a “factor other than sex” where the employer can also establish a 
business related justification for the use of the system.93  Looking to 
the statutory history of the EPA, the court found an employer could 
not assert a job classification system as a “factor other than sex” 
                                                 
87 Id. at 878. 
88 Id. at 876. 
89 Id.  Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit held in Irby v. Bittick that prior salary 
alone is not a legitimate factor other than sex, but reliance on prior salary and 
experience in setting wages for a new employee is a successful affirmative defense 
as a “factor other than sex” because other business reasons then explain the use of 
prior salary.  44 F.3d 949, 955-56 (11th Cir. 1995). 
90 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992). 
91 Id. at 522. 
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 526. 
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without more.94  Requiring an employer to prove that a legitimate 
business reason for the classification system carries out Congress’s 
goal to eradicate wage discrimination.  Without a business reason, 
employers will be able to use a classification system as a pretext for 
discrimination, thus thwarting the purpose and intent behind the 
EPA.95
The requirement for an acceptable business reason is consistent 
with the legislative history of the EPA relied on by the Court in 
Corning, the purpose and policy of the EPA, and the Supreme Court 
decisions in Corning and Gunther.  The “factor other than sex” 
defense was intended to be a catch-all exception to cover bona fide 
business factors other than sex.  However, requiring an employer to 
justify its use of a factor other than sex with a legitimate business 
reason test satisfies the two-step burden shifting required by the EPA.  
Requiring this test ensures that a defendant employer prove that its 
wage discrepancy is not based on sex.  Without the business reason 
test, employers would be able to merely articulate any factor other 
than sex, which does not satisfy the burden placed on defendants under 
EPA litigation, and also “provides a gaping loophole in the [EPA] 
statute through which many pretexts for discrimination would be 
sanctioned.”96
 
                                                 
94 Id. at 525. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  The court stated: 
Based on [the Act’s] statutory history, we conclude that employers 
cannot meet their burden of proving that a factor-other-than-sex is 
responsible for a wage differential by asserting use of a gender-
neutral classification system without more.  Rather, Congress 
intended for a job classification system to serve as a factor-other-
than-sex defense to sex-based wage discrimination claims only 
when the employer proves that the job classification system 
resulting in differential pay is rooted in legitimate business-related 
differences in work responsibilities and qualifications for the 
particular positions at issue.”  
Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525. 
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B.  The Seventh Circuit’s Previous Interpretations regarding the Equal 
Pay Act’s Factor Other than Sex Defense. 
  
 The Seventh Circuit’s recent holding in Wernsing v. 
Department of Human Services stems from its prior cases under the 
EPA dealing the Act’s factor other than sex defense.  The Seventh 
Circuit has never held that the defense requires justification by a 
business-related reason.  However, an examination of the circuit’s 
previous decisions shows a relaxation over the years of the defendant’s 
burden under the EPA, that culminates with a failure to force 
defendants to actually prove their defense.  
In Covington v. Southern Illinois University,97 the plaintiff 
alleged that the University discriminated against her by paying her less 
than a male professor under the EPA and Title VII.98  The district 
court had found that the wage disparity was based on a “factor other 
than sex”: the male professor had a higher education and experience, 
and the university also employed a sex-neutral policy of maintaining 
an employee’s salary when transferred from one assignment to another 
within the university.99  The university argued that this policy was 
adopted to promote employee morale.100  The plaintiff argued that the 
factor other than sex defense under the EPA and Title VII where the 
university maintained an employee’s salary who changed assignments 
required a business-related reason or needed to relate to the 
requirements of the position.101
 The court held that the university’s salary retention policy 
qualified as a factor other than sex.102  While rejecting requiring a 
justification of the factor other than sex defense where prior salary is 
at issue, the court distinguished this case from the decision of the 
Ninth Circuit in Kouba, because a salary retention plan relies on the 
                                                 
97 816 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1987). 
98 Id. at 321. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 322 n.7. 
101 Id. at 321. 
102 Id. at 322. 
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prior salary from the same employer, and not a previous employer.103  
The Seventh Circuit stated that the Kouba court held that because 
wages based on prior salary from a previous employer might be due to 
prior discrimination, prior salary qualifies as a factor other than sex 
only if its use is business-related.  If SIU had considered Covington’s 
prior salary in setting her starting salary, “the same concerns that 
underlie Kouba would still be relevant.”104
However, the Court continued to note that the male professor’s 
salary was influenced by his seven years experience with the 
university that the plaintiff did not possess.105  In this regard, the Court 
supports its holding that a salary retention plan qualifies as a factor 
other than sex defense where it is justified by a business related reason 
– previous experience.   
In addition, the salary retention policy itself had another 
business related component relied on by the Court: “We do not believe 
that the EPA precludes an employer from implementing a policy 
aimed at improving employee morale when there is no evidence that 
that policy is either discriminatorily applied or has a discriminatory 
effect.”106  The Court further stated that although a plaintiff does not 
need to establish discriminatory intent under the EPA,107 an employer 
is not barred from implementing a policy that has not been shown to 
undermine the EPA, even where the policy is not related to the 
requirements of the job.108
After Covington, the Seventh Circuit examined a case 
involving prior salary again in Dey v. Colt Construction & 
Development.109 The plaintiff, Dey, brought a claim alleging that Colt 
violated the EPA where she was paid substantially less than her male 
                                                 
103 Id. at 322-23. 
104 Id. at 323 n.8. 
105 Id. at 324. 
106 Id. at 322. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 28 F.3d 1446 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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successor. 110  Finding that the male successor negotiated a salary 
closer to his previous rate after an initial offer by Colt, combined with 
an educational background superior to Dey’s, the Court held that the 
male successor’s higher salary was based on factors other than sex and 
not therefore in violation of the EPA.111  In its analysis, the Court 
noted that the “factor other than sex” defense did not need to relate to 
the job position or even be business related.112  Interesting to note, the 
Court stated that in considering a factor other than sex, “we ask only 
whether the factor is bona fide, whether it has been discriminatorily 
applied, and in some circumstances, whether it may have a 
discriminatory effect.”113
 Dey’s successor negotiated his salary to an amount closer to 
his prior salary after an initial offer and the court noted that this type 
of evidence “should be considered with some caution…as undue 
reliance on salary history to explain an existing wage disparity may 
serve to perpetuate differentials that ultimately may be linked to 
sex.”114 Although the court made a specific point of noting that the 
“factor other than sex” defense need not be justified by a business 
reason, it in fact was.  Colt did not rely solely on prior salary to 
determine the successor’s initial salary, and the successor instigated 
negotiations over his salary.  Further, at this point the court still 
cautions that in considering a factor other than sex, the factor should 
be bona fide and the court should question whether it may have a 
discriminatory effect.115
 Thus, although the Seventh Circuit has never articulated a 
requirement of a legitimate business reason to justify a factor other 
than sex under the EPA, this requirement is nonetheless evidenced by 
these two cases involving the use of prior salary to set wages.   
 
                                                 
110 Id. at 1461. 
111 Id. at 1461-62. 
112 Id. at 1462. 
113 Id. (citing Fallon v. State of Ill., 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989.)   
114 Id. 
115 Id.  
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IV.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S RECENT DECISION INTERPRETING PRIOR 
SALARY AS A FACTOR OTHER THAN SEX IN AN EQUAL PAY ACT CLAIM 
  
 Wernsing v. Department of Human Services was the first case 
before the Seventh Circuit where an employee’s salary was set solely 
on the basis of her prior salary from a previous employer.  The court 
not only incorrectly analyzed the EPA claim in Wernsing, but also 
ignored its own warning in Covington that where an employer sets 
starting salary based on prior salary from a previous employer “the 
same concerns that underlie Kouba would … be relevant.”116
 
A.  Wernsing v. Department of Human Services.  
 
 In this case, the plaintiff, Wernsing, brought a claim against 
her employer, the Department of Human Services of Illinois, under the 
EPA, alleging that she performed the same tasks as a male coworker, 
under the same working conditions, but was paid substantially less.117  
Wernsing was hired as an Internal Security Investigator II, a position 
that had a monthly pay scale between $2,478 to $4,466 based on prior 
experience and years of service.118  Wernsing had been earning $1,925 
a month at her previous employment, and began with the Department 
at $2,478 a month, almost 30% more than her previous salary.119  
Bingaman, a male coworker hired at the same time as Wernsing for 
the same position, had a starting monthly salary with the Department 
of $3,739, 10% higher than his prior salary.120  Bingaman, therefore, 
was earning substantially more than Wernsing for the same work 
because the Department based its initial starting salaries on the 
previous salary of lateral entrants, plus a raise if possible under the pay 
scale for the position.121  Further, annual 10% raises would preserve 
                                                 
116 Covington v. S. Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d 317, 323 n.8 (7th Cir. 1987). 
117 Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 467 (7th Cir. 2005). 
118 Id.  
119 Id.  
120 Id.  
121 Id. 
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the gap until employees reached the maximum amount under the pay 
scale.122
 The district court held that prior salary is a “factor other than 
sex,” and that the Department was not therefore in violation of the 
EPA.  The district court granted summary judgment for Department 
and Wernsing appealed.  On appeal, Wernsing argued that the 
Department lacked an “acceptable business reason” for using prior 
salaries to set current ones.123  Recognizing that other circuits require 
an acceptable business reason for this approach, the Seventh Circuit 
stated that the EPA only requires that an employer have a reason other 
than sex for its business practices, and does not require that the reason 
be “acceptable.”124   
 The court analogized the EPA to Title VII and other anti-
discrimination statutes, stating  
 
once the plaintiff makes a prima facie case of discrimination, 
all the employer need do is articulate a ground of decision that 
avoids reliance on the forbidden grounds.  The plaintiff then 
bears the burden to show that the stated reason is a pretext for a 
decision really made on prohibited criteria.125
 
The court then criticized the circuits that hold prior salary 
qualifies as a factor other than sex when it is justified by an acceptable 
business reason.126  The Seventh Circuit found that the Ninth Circuit 
in Kouba treated an EPA claim to a disparate impact theory under 
Title VII: where a plaintiff establishes that an employment practice has 
                                                 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 468.  Wernsing also advanced a second argument: “that because all 
pay systems discriminate on account of sex, any use of prior pay to set salary must 
be discriminatory.”  Id.  This article focuses on Wernsing’s first argument, that 
wages are a factor other than sex only when justified by an “acceptable business 
reason.” 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 469 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)) 
(emphasis in original). 
126 Id.  
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a discriminatory effect on a protected group, the employer must then 
show a business necessity for the use of that practice.127  Because the 
EPA deals only with disparate treatment,128 the Seventh Circuit found 
no justification for a business reason under its interpretation of the 
Kouba court’s analysis.129  The applicable rule, the Seventh Circuit 
stated, is the one found in disparate treatment litigation and other 
employment discrimination statutes: “the employer may act for any 
reason, good or bad, that is not one of the prohibited criteria such as 
race, sex, age, or religion.”130
  
B.  A Critique of the Seventh Circuit’s Decision in Wernsing v. Dep’t of 
Human Services. 
 
 The problem with the analysis of the Equal Pay Act claim by 
the Seventh Circuit in Wernsing is that the court analogized the EPA 
to Title VII and other discrimination statutes.131  Because the EPA has 
a different burden of proof than other discrimination statutes – a two-
step burden as opposed to the three step burden of proof under Title 
VII – an employer must prove an affirmative defense under the EPA 
and not merely articulate one.132   
 The court stated that the EPA statute “asks whether the 
employer has a reason other than sex – not whether it has a “good” 
reason.”133  This statement is not entirely correct because the statute 
requires an employer to prove its affirmative defense, or “reason other 
than sex,” and not merely to articulate one.134   
 In addition, the Seventh Circuit also incorrectly rejected the 
legitimate business reason test articulated by the Ninth Circuit in 
                                                 
127 Id.  
128 Id. (citing County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (1981)). 
129 Id. 
130 Id.. 
131 Id. 
132 Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2000).   
133 Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 2005).  
134 Stanziale, 200 F.3d at 107. 
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Kouba.  The court found that the Ninth Circuit analogized the EPA to 
a disparate impact theory and rejected this test because the EPA only 
deals with disparate treatment and not disparate impact.  The problem 
here is that while Title VII deals with disparate treatment and disparate 
impact, theories applying the three-step burden shifting process, the 
EPA has its own two-step burden shifting framework.  The Seventh 
Circuit incorrectly identified the Ninth Circuit as using a disparate 
impact theory because the language “legitimate business reason” is 
also used in the three-step burden shifting framework of disparate 
impact analysis.  However, the Ninth Circuit in Kouba v. Allstate Ins. 
applied the correct two-step EPA burden shift.  Its use of requiring an 
employer to justify the use of prior salary as a factor other than sex 
with a legitimate business reason correctly requires an employer to 
prove its affirmative defense, consistent with the framework of an 
EPA analysis.  Further, as the Second Circuit noted in Aldrick v. 
Randolph Central School District, failing to require the use of a 
legitimate business reason “would provide a gaping loophole in the 
statute through which many pretexts for discrimination would be 
sanctioned.”135   
The Seventh Circuit’s holding creates a situation where EPA 
plaintiffs can win only where they can show that an employer’s 
assertion of prior salary as a reason for a wage discrepancy is really a 
pretext for discriminatory intent.136  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
The EPA can still be an effective tool in ending wage disparities 
between the sexes, but only if it is utilized correctly.  By using the 
three-step burden shifting framework of Title VII to analyze EPA 
claims, the court is effectively eroding the EPA.  EPA claims should be 
treated the way Congress intended – under the two-step burden 
shifting framework provided by the statute.  Under this framework, 
employers must offer concrete proof that the salaries of their 
                                                 
135 963 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1992). 
136 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET. AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 373 (3d ed. 2004). 
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employees are not based on sex.  Analogizing EPA litigation to that of 
Title VII permits courts to too easily accept a mere articulation of a 
reason other than sex, rather than requiring employers to carry their 
burden of proof.   
One method to ensure employers do carry their burden of proof is 
to use the legitimate business test to justify a factor other than sex, 
particularly where the use of prior salary from a previous employer is 
at issue.  Not only does this test ensure that employers will actually 
have to prove that wages are not sex-related, but it is also consistent 
with the purpose and legislative intent behind the statute.   
 Congress passed the EPA in order to remedy the broad wage 
disparity between men and women.137  Because the EPA does not 
require proof of discriminatory intent on behalf of employers, it can be 
even more useful than Title VII in ending the wage disparity, but only 
if it is correctly implemented by the courts.  Treating EPA claims in 
the same manner as Title VII claims erodes the EPA, creates 
defendant-friendly litigation, and undermines the purpose of the EPA – 
the requirement of equal pay for equal work. 
 
                                                 
137 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). 
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